the tragedy of project cybersyn: The story of Chile 1970-73

Quincy Liu

Dr. Robinson

Building the Modern World

29 April 2024

The 1960s saw two superpowers of the Cold War expanding substantially. The United States eyed Chile’s rich copper reserves and heavily invested in the country to take control of its industries (Kornbluh 113). Under a condition where the country heavily relies on the aid of the United States,  Chilean socialist Salvador Allende claimed an unlikely victory in the election of 1970. His government aimed to steer the country towards socialism without violence and created a network dubbed Project Cybersyn that synthesized cybernetics with socialism to facilitate their goal. With real-time adaptation based on information gathering, Cybersyn was undoubtedly a revolutionary political ambition. However, the United States would not allow a country in its back garden to slip away easily. In 1973, a military coup destroyed the socialist government (Kornbluh 13). Even though Cybersyn did not succeed in the 1970s due to the hostile political climate, its technological legacy carries on as the cybernetic idea continues to exist within modern major private firms. However, the political ideal for a democratic and non-violent socialist revolution and hope for a nation’s better future was trapped forever in 1973. 

The socialist government only came after more than a decade of persistence. Salvador Allende ran for the presidency thrice for the Chilean Socialist Party from 1952 to 1964 but never succeeded. In the 1970 election, though, the political coalition of the Unidad Popular (UP), united all leftist parties and increased the supporter base for Allende. By October of 1970, Allende won the election (Medina, Cybernetic 15; Muir, par 1 ). After becoming president, Allende planned for reforms under one main principle: to create socialism while not destroying the democratic framework of Chile. He believed that he could protect the Constitution while simultaneously achieving a revolution. (Muir, par 10). Dubbed the Chilean path to socialism, this ideology would serve as the basis for all of Allende’s reforms.

Allende’s reforms solely focused on the working class. Previously, foreigners and a small minority of rich Chileans monopolized Chilean industries. Therefore, Allende laid blame on their private companies for the country’s underdevelopment and made it his top priority to nationalize industries (Medina, Cybernetic 15). By the first year, they “transferred all major mining firms and 68 other private companies from the private to the public sector” (Medina, “Designing” 579). Despite the government’s oath to protect the democratic framework, it did not consider preserving the economic framework that the elite classes had dominated. Consequently, fear within non-proletariats arose as the nationalization policy damaged the interests of many small business owners. Furthermore, along with Central Unita de Trabajadores de Chile (CUT), the workers’ labor union, the government passed reforms to ensure the immediate improvement of the general economy (Zapata 88). They increased worker salaries by instilling government funds into the economy, or ‘pump priming’. This stimulated and forcefully improved employment rate, salary, and consumer power. The effects came immediately, as Chilean workers’ wages rose by an average of 30%, the GDP by 7.7%, production by 13.7%, and consumption levels by 11.6% by Allende’s first year in office (Medina, “Designing” 579). The improvements helped UP garner larger support among Chileans, especially the proletariat. Allende flirted with ideas of reforms centered around the nationalization of industries and a near populist-like appeal toward the blue-collar class. 

However, these reforms would eventually result in negative repercussions that forced Allende to seek alternative reform methods. Pump-priming eventually hit the economy hard (Medina, Cybernetics 96). Their intent to create more jobs and increase salaries proved to be inconsiderate of the limited amount of production available to factories in the first place. While the policies enjoyed success initially, the number of employees eventually exceeded the work available. Unemployment issues arose again. The national economy fell into the abyss, with inflation increasing by 45.9% by 1971 (Medina, “Designing” 581). The economy regressed beyond control, and Chile’s national treasury had limited money left due to pump priming. Allende needed an alternative method to create his ideal Chile. 

The government then sought a completely different approach to reform. Fernando Flores, an engineer who worked for Allende, proposed the idea of building a cybernetic network – the science of effective organization via technology. Flores contacted Stafford Beer, an expert in management cybernetics, and invited him to come to Chile to help with this endeavor. Stafford Beer specialized in the specific branch of management cybernetics and created the Viable System Model (Medina, Cybernetic 15, 32). This model revolved around a chain interaction between the environment, the governing body of an organization, and the operations within said organization. All three parts are interdependent and influence each other (Beer 00:01:48). In addition, the idea of recursion defined the viable system. To make an analogy, every organ in the human body runs automatically without the brain consciously commanding it. These organs respond to outside stimuli, and the brain only realizes something went wrong if an organ detects unexpected feedback. Similarly, in the viable system model, operations function automatically and adapt to feedback. The system only filters information to the management – the higher levels of recursion, when significant and unexpected feedbacks arise. Instead of a hierarchical command chain system, every single level of the organization adapts and makes decisions on its own towards a common future goal that the management sets (00:01:58, 00:33:22). The system emphasized real-time information gathering to influence decisions and fast communication between all levels of the system. In the synergy of cybernetics and the Chilean government’s idea of politics, the name “Cybersyn” came (Medina, Cybernetics 88). However, the synthesis of these two concepts requires significant groundwork.

To translate pure management cybernetics to political cybernetics, Project Cybersyn comprised four main components: Cyberstride, Cybernet, Opsroom, and Checo (96). These four components corresponded to the aspects of the Viable System Model. The filter between the operations and the management became Cyberstride, which took the form of a piece of software that gathered, analyzed, and distributed economic data (Bottazzi 75). It analyzed data by plotting outliers, determining if data has any significance that needs attenuation (Beer 00:28:45). The software CHECO ran economic simulations from information filtered out by Cyberstride. It tested policies and their effect on the economy. Cybernet allows a pathway through which the software and the industries exchange information (Bottazzi 75). Cyberfolk, while designed separately from Cybernet, played a similar function as the Cybernet. Chileans could dial their real-time mood in their home, which the TV network then distributed to Santiago to measure happiness (Morozov, par. 7). The team used Cyberfolk and Cybernet as ways to allocate feedback on their policies. The highest level of management materialized as the Opsroom. Governors would gather in the Opsroom to discuss responses to the data filtered up by Cyberstride (Medina, Cybernetic 124). In practice, Cyberstride and CHECO directly report significant data back to each recursion level and set a timer. If the operation does not react to that response within a set time, the network knows that it needs help and only then transports the signal to an operation higher up the recursion level. This idea of recursion helped the government know the issues their workers could not solve. This audacious attempt at combining politics with technology tried to solve the problem of a slow bureaucratic government and turn the country into a collective whole, like the human body. They envisioned this system to accomplish Allende’s principle of socialist reform without violence. However, the people whose interests were damaged by the Allende government started to resist. 

In the context of the Cold War and how the United States controlled Chile’s economy before 1970, the socialist ideology endangered the interests of the United States. Therefore, it only made sense for the United States to attempt to oust Allende from the presidency. Before Allende’s election in 1970, the United States had control of over 80% of the country’s copper industry, the nation’s biggest industry (Kornbluh 113). Knowing that Allende would relentlessly oppose them should his election succeed, CIA intervention began as early as during Allende’s campaigns. The CIA poured more than a billion dollars into Chile to improve national satisfaction for former non-Marxist governments and impede support for the Unidad Popular (Medina, Cybernetic 5). CIA also began planning for methods of reducing the Marxist government’s influence after their barricading of Allende’s election unexpectedly failed. On the day of Allende’s election, Nixon already started to discuss ways to “bring about his downfall” (Kornbluh 108). A declassified document years later revealed that they “established contact with Chilean intermediaries or principles interested in promoting a military coup” as early as 1970 (“Report on Chilean” 3). The United States established an economic blockade by denying Chile foreign credit and access to advanced technology to build its network. To make matters worse, the CIA stopped all foreign aid to Chile (Medina, Cybernetic 93). Since Chile previously relied so much on America’s technology and aid, the blockade seriously impeded the development of Project Cybersyn and damaged the lives of countless civilians.

The hardship that the U.S. government brought did not halt the construction of the network. Building a network that requires instantaneous information transmission and analysis requires advanced technology. By this time, Chile only had around fifty outdated computers. (Bottazzi 75). Economic blockades from the United States only further exacerbated the shortage of technology (Medina, Cybernetic 93). Therefore, the Cybersyn team had difficulty obtaining the necessary parts for the network. Fortunately for the Cybersyn team, Chile already possessed a telex machine network between multiple cities: Arica of Northern Chile, the capital of Santiago, Puerto Montt, and Punta Arenas of Southern Chile. These four cities cover Chile’s strip of narrow land and provide a basic but sufficient line of communication. The team decided the information should be funneled to a singular place to analyze information. Therefore, the team decided to place the analytical parts of CHECO, Cyberstride, and the opsroom within the capital, Santiago (Beer 00:19:24, 00:19:48). With primitive technology, the Cybersyn team managed to build a functional system that connected a country from its north down to its south. Even though the team resolved technical difficulties, other issues went beyond their control.

The media became a huge tool for the right wing to sway public opinion against Allende, As far back as 1971, negative press surrounded the Allende government. In an interview conducted by the New York Times in 1971, a citizen compared the future of Allende’s government to Nazi Germany (Davidson 123). Misinterpretations of project Cybersyn arose. Media suspected that Cybersyn intended to create a 1984-esque state of control (Medina, Cybernetic 173). Even though Beer and Allende intended Cybersyn to be a system that guided adaptive decision-making, others viewed information gathering as a method of technocratic control. Even Raul Espejo, a member of the Cybersyn team, later commented that “there is a danger that cybernetics might be used for social repression.” (181). Due to the system’s lack of true political ideology infused within, its failure to consider class relations, and its overemphasis on technology, people had differing opinions about the function of Cybersyn. The network’s usage depends on the ethnic values and political intentions of the person in control. The fear that the government would break its oath to the constitution and use Cybersyn as a privacy-breaching oppressive control system spread across the nation.

Private companies also opposed the Allende government. Allende’s nationalization policy meant squeezing the public’s demand for private companies. Therefore, private companies did their best to resist Allende. The telecommunications company ITT accused the government of using loopholes to bring reforms and requested Congress to scrutinize every proposed reform before employing them (Medina, “Designing” 580). Furthermore, private companies refused to employ pro-Allende citizens (Davidson 130). The forces that had aided Chile in the past had suddenly retracted their hand of help. In a situation where a government wishes to construct a new system with a new ideology non-forcefully from an old ideology, it is simply impossible for people of the old society to convert to the new ways without resistance, especially not with these people holding the most power in the old society. Combined with Allende’s inconsideration for the interests of the people of this class, tension continued to build up.

Ultimately, turmoil led to strikes from the middle class. The bourgeoisie, whom the Allende government failed to consider for the longest time and lived under fear of losing their business with Allende’s nationalization policies, now decided to organize themselves to take down the government in October of 1972 (Zapata 93-94). A provincial truck owner’s association went on strike to protest the creation of a government-owned truck owners’ association in the same province. Other truck owners throughout the nation soon followed suit. Soon, forty thousand drivers were on strike (Medina, Cybernetic 146). Truck drivers played an imperative role in the operation of Cybersyn in resource redistribution. A strike by this population could destroy the nation. Companies of other industries followed suit, even going as far as to pay workers not to come to work to impair production (147). The bourgeoisie class’s discontentment culminated in what later became known as the October Strike.

In response, the Cybersyn team utilized their Cybernetic network to save them from further trouble. Several truck workers opted to support their government. The network retained the capacity to gather data on which locations needed support. Using workers who remained loyal to the government, they delivered products to places in need on time. Although the strike did not have the intended effect as the government stayed in power, it forced the Allende government into a passive position. Eventually, Allende hoped for the Chilean army to clear up the strike. However, the army demanded a place in the cabin. Allende had no choice but to compromise (Morozov, par. 23). Stafford Beer believed that the Chilean government handled a strike of this scale solely due to Cybersyn (Medina, Cybernetics 150). The October Strike was paradoxically the shining moment for Cybersyn and the tipping point in the government’s loss of control. With its base of supporters, the government utilized Cybersyn to show what the people united could accomplish. Even though it proved Cybersyn’s effectiveness at data allocation and resource distribution, it could not sway public opinion. The opposition had encircled the Allende government, forcing them to enter a state of passively fighting against an organized and hostile group instead of proactively making change as a government. All problems built up to this moment and reached a tipping point, with the strike setting up the perfect conditions for a coup. From this point forth, it seemed like Allende’s government had reached its last stand.

By 1973, even from the inside, the Cybersyn team broke apart. While publicizing Cybersyn, team members had conflicting ideas about the political message of Project Cybersyn. Flores and Beer agreed that the project embodied the Chilean socialist ideology. However, several Cybersyn team members, such as director Raul Espejo, considered it an apolitical system for data gathering and decision-making. Aside from differences on the central purpose of Cybersyn, the team had contrasting ideas on how to respond to negative press coverage. Beer thought that hitting back at press coverage that purposefully skewed the image of Cybersyn negatively would help public reception of the project, while Flores refused to respond to the press. These differences eventually led to Beer even drafting a resignation letter. Outside of the top management, some factory managers lower down in the recursion and eventually stopped reporting data to Cybersyn (Medina, Cybernetics 176, 180, 189, 194). As previously stated, a central idea of Beer’s model is that everybody within the system works towards a common goal. Miscommunication between all those involved in the system rendered that goal unclear. People went in different directions, meaning the collective made no progress. With even the team itself disunited and the opposition united and organized, Cybersyn already had a foot in its grave.

Even though Cybersyn continued to operate, the coup seemed inevitable. On September 11, 1973, Augustin Pinochet, backed by the CIA, launched a coup d’etat (Kornbluh 13). Allende spoke on his final national broadcast, in which he assured his people that he would not resign and that history would prove that power would ultimately be in the people’s hands. He defended the La Moneda presidential palace until forces stormed his office. He committed suicide, refusing to be taken alive (632). In retrospect, Allende was not just an idealist. He took his utopian dreams into real life and overcame obstacles to almost realize that dream. He kept his word to protect the democratic freedom of Chile till the moment he died. However, his very ideals ironically caused his demise. He did not take proper control of the army, executive, and legislative branches of the country, and by doing that, he willingly gave up the decision of his fate to others. In that respect, Allende was a tragic hero who defended his ideals until the last moment.

Similarly, the story of Project Cybersyn tells an ironic tragedy, one of a nation’s future forcefully choked to death and the perpetrator using that future to serve their interests. Though the physical Project Cybersyn died in 1973, its legacy lives on. Today, technology-based feedback response systems of private firms that dominate the economic landscape eerily resemble Cybersyn. It almost feels impossible not to rely on systems that read our inputs and adapt to our desires. Most major companies, such as YouTube and Amazon, function this way. Even though the cybernetic spirit imbues both Cybersyn and these companies, the goals of these systems are drastically different. One aimed to create reliance on a majority to maximize profit for a minority, and the other solely aimed to serve the Chilean people. The two systems met different outcomes, too, with one thriving while the other burnt to the ground. Kept is the idea of integrating data and technology to adapt to the desires of the people, but gone is the ideal of serving the people for the sole purpose of serving the people. 

Analyzing the story of Cybersyn objectively, one can conclude that the world of politics is ultimately ruthless. Cybersyn’s failure to consider class relations, miscommunication within its operations, and stubbornness to stick with the non-violent method allowed a powerful government to take advantage easily. But to analyze this story from a humane and ethical standpoint, America and Pinochet undoubtedly robbed the freedom of the Chileans and condemned Chile to an oppressive regime that killed thousands (Medina, Cybernetic 225). In his final speech, Allende hoped for a better future, “Workers of my country, I have faith in Chile and its destiny. Other men will overcome this dark and bitter moment when treason seeks to prevail. Go forward knowing that, sooner rather than later, the great avenues will open again, and free men will walk through them to construct a better society.” However, it seems now that the ones walking on great avenues of Cybersocialism that Allende planned out will not be the people of Chile but the business owners of capital for the foreseeable future. 

Works Cited:

Allende, Salvador. “Final Speech.” 11 Sept. 1973. Brown University Library, Brown University, library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-10-chile/primary-documents-w-accompanying-discussion-questions/document-25-final-speech-by-salvador-allende-1973/#:~:text=Workers%20of%20my%20country%2C%20I,Long%20live%20Chile! Accessed 28 Apr. 2024. Speech.

Beer, Stafford. “Cybernetics Part 3.” 24 Jan. 1974. YouTube, uploaded by Guillame Remy, 10 Sept. 2017, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g6Fc3BqcRNU&ab_channel=GuillaumeREMY. Accessed 28 Apr. 2024. Lecture.

Bottazzi, Roberto. Digital Architecture beyond Computers: Fragments of a Cultural History of Computational Design. Bloomsbury Visual Arts, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/wra-ebooks/reader.action?docID=5345451&ppg=76. Accessed 8 Feb. 2024.

Davidson, Sara. “Living through the Allende Revolution: Living under Allende.” New York Times, 17 Oct. 1971, pp. SM33+. ProQuest Historical Newspapers, http://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/living-through-allende-revolution/docview/119256803/se-2?accountid=49314. Accessed 2 Apr. 2024.

Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File : a Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New Press, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central, ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/wra-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1370818. Accessed 27 Apr. 2024.

Medina, Eden. Cybernetic Revolutionaries: Technology and Politics in Allende’s Chile. MIT Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/wra-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3339354. Accessed 10 Apr. 2024.

—. “Designing Freedom, Regulating a Nation: Socialist Cybernetics in Allende’s Chile.” Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 38, no. 3, Aug. 2006, pp. 571-606. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875872. Accessed 2 Feb. 2024.

Morozov, Evgeny. “The Planning Machine.” New Yorker, vol. 90, no. 31, 13 Oct. 2014, p. 119+. Academic Search Premier, http://www.infohio.org/launch/?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=url,cookie,ip,custuid&custid=infohio&db=aph&AN=98973976&site=ehost-live&scope=site. Accessed 6 Feb. 2024.

Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970. U.S. CIA, 18 Nov. 1970. Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc01.pdf. Accessed 27 Apr. 2024.

Zapata S., Francisco. “The Chilean Labor Movement under Salvador Allende: 1970-1973.” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 3, no. 1, winter 1976, pp. 85-97. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633254. Accessed 4 Feb. 2024.